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Abstract The future Internet will embrace the intelligence of Web 3.0 and the omnipres-
ence of every day connected objects. The later was envisioned as the Internet of Things.
Security and interoperability concerns are hindering the service innovations using the Inter-
net of Things. This paper addresses secure access provision to Internet of Things-enabled
services and interoperability of security attributes between different administrative domains.
In this paper we proposed a layered architecture of Internet of Things framework where a
semantically enhanced overlay interlink the other layers and facilitate secure access provi-
sion to Internet of Things-enabled services. The main element of semantic overlay is security
reasoning through ontologies and semantic rules. Finally the interoperability of security
aspect is addressed through ontology and a machine-to-machine platform. This paper pro-
vides implementation details of security reasoning and the interoperability aspects and dis-
cusses crucial challenges in these areas.
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1 Introduction
The Web 2.0 facilitates user-centric collaboration. In Web 3.0, Internet becomes intelligent
as the Web itself understands the meaning of its contents. However, the future Internet is no
longer limited to connecting people and services, it envisioned to connect every things that
were not historically connected. Within this vision Internet of Things (IoT) creates a new
paradigm of Internet that is intelligent and omnipresent.
Through IoT new digital ecosystem creates new business opportunities for retail, logis-
tics, food, health, energy, smart home, and transportation sectors. For instance, IBM
utilized the IoT for Norwegian Sea oil platforms by implementing a service, which
gathers real-time information from the bottom of Sea so that a better decision can be
made in order to drill down to the Sea. The miniaturization of devices, increase of
computational power, and reduction of energy consumption support this new ecosystem
driven by IoT. However, coupling of intelligence with omnipresence is not a trivial job.
Objects ranging from powerful nodes to tiny sensors constitute the ‘Things’ in Internet of
Things.
Offering innovative services using intelligent and omnipresent IoT is hindered due to sev-
eral technical and non-technical challenges such as reliable integration of scores of ‘Things’;
scalability of systems; security, privacy and interoperability concerns. In this paper, we are
going to limit our focus on security and interoperability concerns. Among the security chal-
lenges such as ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability and access control, we only
focus secure access provision to IoT-enabled services. Within the scope of interoperability
of security, this paper will address how different security attributes and constraints lying in
different administrative domains will work together to secure an integrated operation. The
concepts and results presented in this are the outcome of the research conducted in an ongoing
European project, pSHIELD [1].
In this regard we propose a functional architecture of the IoT framework that incorporates
secure access provision. We implemented several components of the functional architecture
using the semantic technologies. As a whole, the paper makes the following key contributions:
– A functional architecture of IoT framework is going to be introduced.
– In the architecture, a semantic overlay (on top of ‘Things’) is proposed to facilitate the
intelligence in IoT.
– Ontologies are designed to contrive partly the semantic overlay.
– A rule-based service access mechanism is proposed.
– Interoperability of security is going to be addressed through ontology and machine-to-
machine (M2M) technology.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 provides motivation of includ-
ing semantic overlay layer into the IoT framework, Sect. 3 presents the Interoperable Rail
Information System (IRIS) scenario that introduces the secure access and interoperability
of security aspects, Sect. 4 explains the detailed security requirements of an IoT environ-
ment, Sect. 5 introduces the conceptual view and functional architecture of the proposed IoT
framework, the implementation details of part of the proposed architecture and the interop-
erability of security aspect will be presented in Sect. 6, the next section will discuss several
related works, and introduce the challenges and future works in relation to the the areas
presented in this paper. The paper will conclude with a summary of the key contributions of
the research.
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2 Motivation
This section provides a brief discussion on the motivation of incorporating an overlay layer
and semantic enhancement of such layer in the IoT framework.
2.1 Overlay
Sensors sensing the environments constitute one of the key elements of the Internet of Things.
In most cases sensors are resource constrained devices having no or limited processing capa-
bility. Most of them are only capable of retrieving information from the environment. In order
to provide services, we need to derive some decisions based on these retrieved information
and pre-defined logics. For example, In case of secure access we need to compute access
authorization decisions based on complex constraints. Instead of hardcoded decisions, we
need dynamic update of decisions. Nowadays human intervention is not desirable for these
decision making processes. It requires automated reasoning which is defined as the process of
deriving new facts based on predefined knowledge. Such reasoning process involves exten-
sive information processing and computation of data and logics. Hence reasoning requires
structured knowledge about the devices and sensors, sensor networks, and sensor data.
To realize these, on top of physical IoT environment we need an overlay that contains a
model to describe these structured knowledge and a reasoning process.
2.2 Semantic Enhancement
From a technological point of view, semantics mean the explicit interpretation of domain
knowledge to make machine processing more intelligent, adaptive and efficient. The data
along with their interpretation are critical for decision making and planning. In this regard,
semantic technologies that include standards, methodologies and tools act as the enabler.
Berners-Lee et al. [2] first envisioned the promise of the Semantic Web technologies in order
to make the meaning of data useful. Semantic technologies make use of the formal meaning
of data and information for deriving new knowledge from the known facts. Semantic tech-
nologies can satisfy the requirements described in previous section through the following
capabilities:
– machine understandable knowledge description
– machine understandable logic description
– automated reasoning
3 The Interoperable Rail Information System (IRIS)
This section will introduce a specific scenario (IRIS) around which we are going to propose
an architecture and implement a prototype. The scenario envisioned a continuous monitoring
of trains and railway infrastructure. The scenario puts forward the interoperability of security
requirement and this section will explain this issue.
3.1 Scenario Description
The purpose of this scenario is twofold (i) detecting any unusual condition such as high
temperature of components, vibrations and unexpected movement, and (ii) transferring and
making available such information to different actors (i.e., train operator, rail infrastructure
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Fig. 1 Infrastructure scenario, collecting and distributing sensor information
owner, consumer) involved in the rail system both automatically and in a request/response
demand-based passive mode. The train is equipped with several heterogeneous computing
devices such as sensors, actuators, GPS receiver, and gateway-embedded computer for detec-
tion of such conditions. These devices interact using heterogeneous protocols for sensing the
information in their vicinity and send it to the gateway. As an intelligent device, the gate-
way figures out any irregularity, and it sends the details to the smart train operator. If the
irregularity information is related with rail infrastructure, then the infrastructure owner and
provider will also be interested to know the information. The gateway sends this information
to all concerning actors, but they also need monitoring and periodically checking about the
condition of the train and the rail infrastructure. The gateway embedded-computer is geared
with the proposed IoT virtualization framework that exposes the train sensors as services for
enabling on-demand remote monitoring application.
Figure 1 outlines the main elements of the IRIS scenario where the third party service
providers can access the sensor data collected from the railway infrastructures. It is required
to ensure the secure access and interoperability of security when they are transferred from
one administrative domain (the Railway) to another administrative (any Service Provider).
In this paper, we are concerned with the following two aspects:
– access to sensors and sensor data
– interoperable security between different administrative domains
In order to facility sensor integration and interoperability, this work makes use of the
standardized machine-to-machine (M2M) technology as suggested by ETSI.
3.2 Cell-Based M2M Standardisation
According to the definition from [3], the concept of M2M denotes a communication mech-
anism between two or more machines in a network. The main goal of M2M is to make the
devices communicate with each other without human interaction, the so-called automatic
network of smart devices. The idea behind the M2M technology is to enable the flow of
information between different devices, so that the device can deliver the observations it has
performed on the site to the end users (at remote location).
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has proposed an architec-
tural standard, TS 102.690 that can be used for any infrastructure based on the M2M concept
[4]. The main focus is on generation of the eco-system of device manufacturers, service
providers and trusted third parties.
Details are defined in the technical standards document TS 102 690, which a.o. describes
authentication and authorization of applications through the Network Security Capability
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(NSEC). The suggested solution is based on a hierarchical set of cryptographic keys, starting
with a root key K R being used to create service keys KS and allowing for one application key
K A per application [4]. The main application environment heads towards an M2M device or
gateway being able to negotiate the K R , supporting mobile-based installations.
3.3 Interoperability of Security
Even though the TS 102 690 supports root, session and application keys K R, KS , and K A,
the current implementation is based on username/password to achieve access to the sensor
data. Such a limitation does not support role-based, context-based or content-based access, as
necessary for the integrated operation as indicated in our scenario. In addition when multiple
administrative domains are integrated, varying definition of roles, contexts and contents
across the domains are real concerns for integrated operation. As for example, during the
integrated operation the following questions may arise:
– how the system would recognize two different roles from different administrative domains
that literally possess the same access rights?
– how the system would make distinction between the security levels defined using different
notions at different administrative domains?
These two situations will be revisited in the Sect. 6 for further clarification. When multiple
stakeholders are involved in operation, the security attributes and constraints need to be inter-
operable across the border. We envision an extension of the current TS 102 690 that can deal
with this requirement. Our implementation is based on the functional architecture of Fig. 3,
using the semantic overlay for the interoperability of security attributes. Based on a definition
of the content of a sensor, e.g. temperature higher than anticipated range, a service notifier is
activated allowing service access for operators with corresponding access rights. A second
example includes the position of the train in case of normal and delayed operation. Delay
margins are characterized in the semantic overlay to allow for distributions as on-time or
delayed between 3 and 5 min, which is information available for everyone, and 30 s delay as
information for the train control at the control center.
4 Handling Security in IoT
This section outlines the conventional security requirements for an IoT environment and
how security operation can be externalized. The interoperability of security becomes a crucial
requirement for integrated operation and the issue has been explained in the previous section.
4.1 Conventional Security Requirements for IoT
We anticipate that security of IoT will soon become a challenging task as IoT paradigm
will bridge the physical world with future internet. The increasing complexity of the system
will multiply the number of security challenges. All IoT services need to satisfy some basic
security properties. However, additional security requirements for a specific IoT service may
depend on specific applications and contexts.
4.1.1 Confidentiality
IoT services may contain sensitive data; therefore, IoT connected objects data should be kept
confident. Confidentiality can be achieved through encryption. Different existing symmetric
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and asymmetric encryption schemes can be leveraged to ensure confidentiality. However,
selection of a particular type of encryption is highly application and device capability depen-
dent. To exemplify, consider a smart home environment that maintains the information about
the owner activity at the home. The owner will never welcome that anybody who comes to
his home will read the data just by viewing the activity monitoring device.
4.1.2 Integrity
IoT services exchange critical data with other services and also with the third parties (e.g.,
authorities, service providers, control centers etc.), which put forward stringent demand that
sensed, stored and transmitted data must not be tampered either maliciously or acciden-
tally. Integrity protection of sensor data is crucial for designing reliable and dependable IoT
applications. This is ensured with message authentication codes (MAC) using one way hash
functions. The selection of MAC technique again depends on application and device capa-
bilities. Consider the example of smart home that is connected with the smart grid. The smart
grid provider deployed an electricity consumption monitoring service in order to produce
electric bill. The provider never wants that the consumption data can be tampered during
transmission.
4.1.3 Availability
Our envisaged IoT environment may comprise of sensor node hosted services. Therefore, it is
extremely important that these IoT services be available from anywhere at any time in order
to provide information (i.e., measured data, sensor alarm, etc.) continuously. There is no
single security protocol that can satisfy this property. However, different pragmatic measures
can be taken to ensure the availability. For example, in the aforementioned smart home if
the attacker knows the consumption monitoring service, he can launch the denial-of-service
(DoS) attack by just trying to send false service requests and the sensor nodes are incapable
of handling huge number of requests due to resource limitations. Since any transmission (i.e.,
receiving or sending) consume power, the node will eventually run out of its battery.
In addition to these traditional security properties we also identify the following properties
that need to be addressed by any IoT environment.
4.1.4 Authentication
It refers to the means used for the verification of one’s identity. In IoT context, mutual authen-
tication is required because IoT data is used in different decision making and actuating pro-
cesses. Therefore, both the service provider and service consumer needs to be assured that the
service is access by authentic user and service is offered by an authentic source. Furthermore,
strong authentication mechanism needs to be deployed in order to prevent impersonation.
Enforcing any authentication mechanism requires to register user identities and resource
limitation of IoT objects poses stringent constraints to enable any authentication technique.
4.1.5 Authorization
It refers to the means of expressing the access polices that explicitly assign certain permis-
sions to subjects. The IoT environment needs to provide fine-grained, re-useable, dynamic,
easy to use polices defining and updating mechanism. Thereby, it is imperative to externalize
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the policy definition and enforcement mechanism of IoT services. Furthermore, the resource
limitation of IoT sensor node restricts to employ such mechanism.
4.1.6 Access Control
This is an enforcement mechanism that allows only authorized users’ access to the resources.
The enforcement is usually based on access control decisions. Since, IoT is becoming omni-
present, privacy issue has become a real concern. For instance, consider the example of
smart home that has smart power metering as IoT services and without a proper access con-
trol mechanism it could not only lead to disclosure of electricity usage pattern but it could
also help adversary to deduce user related information such as when the user is at home,
at office or traveling. Even it is possible to infer about the user activity (i.e., watching TV,
sleeping, etc.) and home appliance present in the home. Therefore, it is extremely important
to disclose users data only to authorized parties.
4.1.7 Trustworthiness
Many applications which are sensitive in nature such as safety critical services, health care
services need to assess trustworthiness of several entities involved. From IoT application per-
spective, assessing trustworthiness of sensors and sensor data is important. Malicious sensor
nodes and erroneous or non-trustworthy sensor data can lead to a disaster in a safety criti-
cal situation. Untrusted sensor data may come from a trusted sensor node. Non-trustworthy
behavior may have two reasons: intentional misbehavior and unintentional errors. It might be
easier to ensure trustworthiness of Internet of Things by including trustworthiness assessment
feature than by hardening the security of nodes and data through physical measures.
4.1.8 Auditing
The auditing keeps track of the user’s interaction with the system. The IoT environments
need to know when their services are accessed, who is making the service request, when
the request is happening. This information will not only help in managing the security but
also in evaluating security risk. In case of security breach, such information may help in
identifying the security hole exist in the system. Maintaining an audit-trail in IoT services is
a challenging task.
4.2 Security Proxy Model
The authorized access to IoT services or data becomes the pivotal issues, which was consid-
ered to be trivial in the past due to very low number of attacks. These contemporary security
models are based on firewall and SSL that could only provide point-to-point security, which
does not fit in a IoT.
This paper proposes a security proxy model for IoT services by leveraging SOA [5]
approach to satisfy the requirements outlined in previous section. Figure 2 depicts the overall
security proxy approach. The proxy consists of Audit and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
that is connected to a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and an Identity manager (IdM). The Audit
is responsible for managing the logs of service calls-out and maintains the history of service
interaction. The proxy follows the principal of reverse proxy but we tailored it to the special
characteristics of the IoT. The security proxy acts as a service level gateway in front of IoT
services. The service consumers access IoT service through the security proxy. In this case,
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Fig. 2 Security proxy model
the security proxy plays a role of edge-oriented policy enforcement point, which uses a policy
decision point (PDP) to get access decisions.
Among the security requirements described above, we are going to address the access
authorization and access control aspects in this paper. We exploit semantic rules to express
the access authorization constraints to infer access decisions. We named this process security
reasoning which will be described in Sect. 6.
5 From Concepts to Architecture
In light of the scenario and the security focus of the paper, this section will propose a con-
ceptual view of the Internet of Things framework. The understanding of the concepts will
then help introducing a functional architecture of Internet of Things.
5.1 The Conceptual View of IoT Framework
The high level view of the proposed IoT framework is illustrated in Fig. 3. The framework
targets the user-centric IoT cloud, consisting of different classes of devices. We classify
these devices in nano, micro and personal nodes based on their capabilities (see Sect. 6 for
classification). The main driver for the virtualization framework is to ease the application
development process for IoT. The framework helps the application developers to focus on the
application logic by minimizing the development efforts related to connectivity, monitoring
and security. The proposed framework combines technologies from SOA [5] and semantic
web to address the dynamics to a real-time IoT cloud.
The core idea is to provide the semantic description of node types, capabilities of an IoT
cloud and expose nodes capabilities in the form of web services. This will not only integrate
the IoT with service-world but it will also allow third party applications to query about the
data resided in the IoT cloud.
5.2 Functional Architecture
The functional architecture of the proposed IoT framework is illustrated in Fig. 4. The archi-
tecture is composed of four layers: (i) the Communication and Real-world Access Layer, (ii)
the Semantic Overlay Layer, (iii) the Service Virtualization Layer, and (iv) the Application
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Fig. 3 The conceptual view of IoT framework
Layer. The framework follows the separation of concerns [6] principals, where each layer is
responsible for different concerns. Here, we will provide the overview of each layer of the
proposed Internet of Things architecture.
5.2.1 The Communication and Real-World Access Layer
The layer provides an interface with an underlying IoT cloud. It implies an adapter oriented
approach to address the technological diversity regarding nodes and communication mech-
anisms. The layer provides different adapters to communicate with different type of nodes
for example Sun SPOT adapter to communicate with Sun SPOT nodes. The layer perform
number of tasks such that discovering nodes, receiving events from nodes and dispatching
them to upper layers both for making sense of the events and sending them to their subscriber,
and invoking services hosted on the nodes.
5.2.2 The Semantic Overlay Layer
The semantic overlay layer acts as both the integrator and the interface between different
layers. It provides the semantic model of an underlying IoT cloud by maintaining IoT ontol-
ogy, sensor ontology, event ontology and service access polices. The layer also performs
number of tasks such as facilitating create, read, update and delete (CRUD) operations on
the semantic model, and translating SensorML [7] description into OWL description.
5.2.3 The Service Virtualization Layer
The service virtualization layer provides web service interface for the functional aspects of
the nodes in an IoT cloud. The layer perform various tasks such as translating virtual service
into web service definition, generating micro-formats of available web service, publishing
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Fig. 4 Functional architecture
services both in service registries and social network sites, and notifying subscribers about
the IoT cloud events.
5.2.4 The Application Layer
The application layer contains the real applications created using the data, semantics of
data and application logics. Resolving the interoperability issues between different service
provider’s platforms is the functionality of this layer.
6 Implementation
This section presents the implementation details of the security reasoning and interoperability
functionalities. The security reasoning module would be located in the semantic overlay layer
of the functional architecture (Fig. 4). From the use case scenario description (see Fig. 1),
this module may lie either on-board the wagon or at the railway administrator platform.
6.1 Security Reasoning
The security reasoning functionality derives access authorization decisions to IoT-enabled
services. It requires a formal knowledge base of the whole domain containing sensor, sensor
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Table 1 OWL building blocks used to design the ontology
Ontology element Ontology building block Explanation
Class owl:subClassOf SC (C1) ⊆ SC (C2), the semantic scope of
C1 is narrower than that of C2
owl:disjointWith SC (C1) ∩ SC (C2) = 0, each
owl:disjointWith statement asserts that C1
and C2 have no individuals in common
owl:unionOf The semantic scope of C3
is SC (C1) ∪ SC (C2)
owl:intersectionOf The semantic scope of C3
is SC (C1) ∩ SC (C2)
owl:complementOf SC (C1) = SC (C2), the semantic scope
of C1 is the complement of the scope C2
owl:equivalentClass SC (C1) = SC (C2), the semantic scope
of C1 is equal to the scope C2
Property Property P(i1, i2) states that i1 relates with i2
through the property P . i2 can be a
numeric value in case of datatype property
owl:symmetricProperty If P relates i1 & i2 then P also relates i2 &
i1 and can be represented as P ≡ P−,
where P is the inverse property of P−
Instance Instance {i1, i2, . . . , in} : SC(C1), instances
i1, i2, . . . ., in belong to class C1
owl:sameAs {i1} = {i2}, two instances i1, i2 are stated as
the same
owl:differentFrom {i1} = {i2}, two instances , i1, i2 are stated
as different from each other
data, users and user attributes such as role. Semantic rule specifies the access authorization
constraints and the execution of rules will generate the authorization decisions.
6.1.1 Formal Knowledge Base
A knowledge base is a repository of information about a particular domain of interests.
Among the two different types of knowledge base: human-readable knowledge base and
machine-readable knowledge base [8], this research used the later one because of its machine
understandability. For example, the sensor node descriptions (e.g. identifiers, capabilities)
and the extracted data and relevant semantics will be formally represented in the knowledge
base. A typical knowledge base consists of concepts, properties, and instances. We encoded
the knowledge base using the ontology [9] and to be more specific we used the Web Ontology
Language (OWL) [10]. The ontology is a set of classes C , properties P and instances i . The
key concepts of the domain are defined through classes. In ontology a property establishes
the relationship between the two instances. A property belongs to a domain and has a range.
Syntactically, a domain links a property to a class and range links a property to either a class
or a data range [10]. From an instance point of view, a property relates instances from the
domain with the instances from the range. The real actors of a practical use case scenario (e.g.
individuals) are defined through instances and they belong to the classes. At the beginning
we started with a very simple ontology and we used the building blocks of OWL defined in
Table 1 to design the ontology. We assume that the semantic scope (SC) of a concept (class)
Ci is represented as SC(Ci ).
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Fig. 5 Overview of the ontologies through classes and properties
In the initial implementation, the complete knowledge base is divided into three differ-
ent ontologies: Sensor Ontology, Event Ontology, and Access Control Ontology. Figure 5
illustrates these ontologies through main classes and properties. These three ontologies are
interlinked and evaluation of some rules (discussed in the next section) requires retrieving of
elements from multiple ontologies. The instances of the ontologies are derived from actors
of the IRIS scenario described in Sect. 3.
Sensor Ontology: It describes the sensors and the retrieved data by the sensors.
Event Ontology: It describes faults and their characteristics. Most of the instances of these
classes are derived from the Sensor Ontology using certain policies.
Access Control Ontology: It describes the actors involved in secure access provisioning.
relatesTo property links Sensor Data Type (domain) to Application (range). Similarly relat-
esTo links Alarm Type and Recommended Action to Application. This is how these three
ontologies are interlinked through a property relatesTo. In this paper, we used Protégé Ontol-
ogy editor platform [11] to design these ontologies.
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6.1.2 Semantic Rules
The policy encodes definite course of actions to determine present and future decisions.
Through policies the middleware layer provides the reasoning support aiming for decision
making. The reasoning process derives new facts (the decisions) based on the constraints
defined on top of the pre-defined facts (the knowledge base). The policy in the middleware
layer is composed of constraints that control the courses of actions in decision making pro-
cess. Sometime such process only handles the composition of sensors and sensor data. Then
the policy will simply be responsible for the discovery of right sensors and sensor data. The
applications in the upper layer and the requirements of the applications govern the design
and specification of the policies. Policies are specified manually under the umbrella of each
application or multiple applications. The policies and the knowledge base work closely so
that the elements of the constraints can come from the knowledge base and multiple con-
straints can be added in conjunction within a policy. We implemented the policies using the
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [12] and the Semantic Web Query–Enhanced Web
Rule Language (SQWRL) [13].
We want to create a semantic rule that would in practice allow only specific Role group
members within the service provider administrative domain to access an application such as
monitoring. The underlying features of monitoring application are for example establishing
communication with the sensors, retrieve and transfer data across multiple domain etc. The
complete detail of such application is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the imple-
mentation of establishing communication to sensors has been demonstrated in the Sect. 6.2
of this paper.
At the initial phase of implementation, we are concerned with ensuring access authoriza-
tion provision to authenticated service. The logical explanation of rule to generate decisions
on access authorization provision is:
If User Identifier belongs to specific Organization (e.g. JBV)
and User Identifier belongs to a specific Role Group,
and the Role Group possesses a certain Security Level,
and the Monitoring application requires the same Security Level,
then that particular User is allowed to access Monitoring application.
In this case, we assume that not all Supervisor has the same security level. This can be
represented through the following semantic rule using the SWRL syntax:
belongsT o (User I denti f er, J BV ) ∧ has Role (User I denti f er, Supervisor) ∧
possess (Supervisor, Level4) ∧ requires (Monitoring, Level4) ⇒
allowedT oAccess (User I denti f er, Monitoring)
6.1.3 Interoperability Through Ontology
We planned to resolve the interoperability problem using an ontology and a M2M platform.
The ontology in this case makes the keyword mapping. In order to clarify the interoperability
aspect, we take into consideration the following two situations:
Different Role Group: This situation refers to the scenario where different organizations
maintain their Roles/Responsibilities in a different way. Across the organizational bound-
ary Role names can be different, meaning and responsibilities can be different, and even
the hierarchies can also vary. For example, role hierarchies of the Railway Administration
(Fig. 1) can be as follows:
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Supervisor ⇒ GroupLeader ⇒ Engineer ⇒ T echnical ⇒ FieldW orker
When a user belongs to an Express Mail Service Provider (that is using the freight train
to carry goods) is willing to access the Monitoring application, it is necessary to map the
role of this user to the equivalent role of the Railway Administration. While mapping we
always have to consider the corresponding security levels the roles possess. If the user is
a Supervisor of the Service Provider and we assume that he should possess the security
level similar to what an Engineer of the Railway Administration possesses. The mapping
(inside the mapping ontology) was done using owl:equivalentClass constructs (described




) = SC (EngineerOrganizationB
)
, where Role Groups are
subclasses of the class Role.
Different Security Level: This situation points to the case when different organizations
maintain their security level in a different way. In order to process an access request coming
from the Express Mail Service Provider, it is required to map the security level of their
users to that of the users at the Railway Administration. Referring to the situation when
the above rule (Sect. 6.1.2) is applied, we map security level (Level 1) of the Supervisor
of the Service Provider to that (Level 4) of an Engineer of the Railway Administration.
The mapping was done using owl:sameAs constructs between these two Security Level





, where Security Levels were defined as
instances of the ontology.
6.1.4 Rule Execution Environment
In this paper, policies are formal description of constraints. The constraints are represented
through a set of rules. The evaluation of rules will derive the decisions. In this regard, the
implementation used a rule execution engine. The policies are executed using Jess rule engine
[14] and the results represent the decisions. As the rules are built on top of the OWL knowledge
base, SWRLJess bridge (a java class) allows the rule engine to interact with the knowledge
base and SWRL-SQWRL rules.
6.2 Sensor Integration to M2M Platform
We are still in the early phase of integrating the proposed security reasoning into the proto-
type which requires significant enhancement of the current M2M platform. This paper only
demonstrates sensor integration using a legacy M2M platform. This section provides details
of the implementation using SunSPOT sensors being integrated into the Telenor Object’s
M2M platform.
6.2.1 Classification of Sensor Nodes
While implementing the prototype, we classified different nodes (‘Things’ in IoT) as nano,
micro and personal nodes according to the increasing order of capabilities. Many of such
nodes can act like a sensor. An overview of each type of node and a description of specific
nodes we used for the prototype are given as follows. Table 2 summarizes the capabilities
of the different sensor nodes.
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Table 2 Capabilities of different types of sensor nodes
Capability Nano node Micro node Personal node
Hardware Limited Limited Extendable
Processing No processing power








Network access Through gateway Through gateway Direct access
Communication interface Fixed or wireless Fixed or wireless Fixed or wireless or USB-like
Example nodes GPS sensor Sun SPOT Personal computer or
Linux embedded
system
Nano node: It is a sensor with lowest capabilities. It senses the surrounding environment
and sends data to other nodes. It has no processing power. A typical example of nano node
is a GPS sensor.
Micro node: In terms of capabilities micro node is more powerful than a nano node. It con-
tains limited processing power to perform some basic tasks such as comparison between
two values. This type of sensor nodes are programmable. But communication with micro
nodes is only possible through gateways.
In the proposed prototype we used Sun SPOT sensors as micro nodes. The main units are
SPOT devices with embedded sensors and base station. Each Sun SPOT has a so-called
eSPOT with battery, while the base station is not equipped with battery and must be pow-
ered from the host computer via an USB cable. The main hardware components of a SPOT
senor platform are as follows:
– 180 MHz for 32-bit ARM920T core processor with 512K RAM and 4M Flash, runs
on Squawk Virtual Machine (VM)
– 2,4 GHz based IEEE 802.15.4 radio which is integrated in the antenna
– Integrated Sensors: temperature sensor, accelerometer sensor, light sensor
– I/O pins (analog and digital)
– 3.7 V battery (720 mAh)
– USB interface for connecting to a host computer
Squawk is a highly portable Java VM which can run without an operating system. It allows
multiple applications running on the same VM. Squawk supports connectivity with mobile
phones.
Personal node: This type of nodes support high processing power and direct communi-
cation with the nodes. Such nodes can manipulate complex ontologies and rules. We used
Linux-based embedded system as our personal node in the prototype.
Our embedded system is a VIA EPIA N700 Nano-ITX board which is integrated with a
VIA VX800 media system processor, an all-in-one chipset solution. The VIA EPIA N700
is equipped with a power-efficient 1.5 GHz VIA C7, supports up to 2 GB of DDR2 system
memory and includes two onboard SATA connectors, USB 2.0, COM and Gigabit LAN
ports. Expansion includes a Mini-PCI slot with an IDE port, additional COM and USB
ports and PS/2 support available through pin-headers. The implementation uses Ubuntu
Linux Kernel 2.6.32-24-generic and Java runtime environment (JRE) 1.6 for development
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on this embedded system. In the proposed prototype, this system hosts an application
facilitates the communication between SPOT sensors and the M2M platform.
6.2.2 M2M Platform
For our implementation, we used Shepherd™, an M2M platform from Telenor Objects,
Norway which is an instance of ETSI TS 102 690. It is a platform for interoperability and
integration that supports communication between connected devices (e.g.,nano and micro
sensors) and makes them accessible from anywhere at anytime. Any pluggable component
can be connected in Shepherd platform as a connected object. The platform offers number
of services including:
– Service Management for monitoring, device configuration, SLAs, and supporting.
– Service Enabler has a specific API that allows further access to other modules.
– Message Engine handles and secures the process of message flow, including capturing,
processing, routing and storage of data in an environment.
– Notification services that inform about the status of devices and applications.
– Device library consists of interfaces for tools and services recognition.
The Shepherd offers two methods for establishing connection:
– HTTP Connection API
– The Connected Objects Operating System (COOS) which is a Java based open source
tool.
In our scenario we use the http connection API for access to the information from the railway
infrastructure.
6.2.3 Prototyping the Sensor Integration
The devices used in the implementation are shown in Fig. 6. Figure 7 illustrates the system
overview of the implemented prototype. It shows the establishment of an intended two-way
communication between Sun SPOT sensors and its base station, and also two-way commu-
nication between the embedded Linux system (where host application was installed) and the
Shepherd Platform. An instance of proposed framework in the form of Host application has
been developed, that performs broadcasts every 15 s. While the spot application will detect
the broadcasts every 30 s. But it does not transmit the sensory data to the base station after
1 min has passed since the last envoy. When the data arrives, it will also be stored in-memory
cache. At the same time the Host application sends out a request to Shepherd for receiving
the data. The connection is opened until the application has received confirmation of receipt
from the Shepherd. However, the data to be sent to Shepherd only happens in every 5 min.
7 Discussion
This section introduces several other works that are closely related to the concepts and archi-
tecture of the proposed Internet of Things framework. However, implementing a complete
prototype is quite challenging. In this context, this section discusses some of these challenges.
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Fig. 6 The devices used in the implementation
Fig. 7 Integration of sun SPOT sensors with Shepherd platform
7.1 Related Work
IoT is tightly coupled with the sensor technologies because of their sensing, actuating and
communication capabilities. The sensor technologies have become pivotal to influence the
physical objects in the creation and usage of future services. Besides convenience such as
the Nike+iPod iPhone application [15], impact is expected for energy saving, i.e. energy
grids, health or security services. Monitoring the home and informing neighbors in case of
accidents and alarms might be such an application. Here context- and content-awareness is
important. Depending on ‘what happened’ and ‘who is available’ will trigger the reasoner to
decide who has to be informed. Such a social network based reasoning is subject to further
research.
Light weight semantics make the information machine readable that facilitates export of
knowledge by software agents and automated machine processing. Nowadays tiny nodes may
even have processing capability or memory enough for interpreting light weight semantic
models. Light weight semantics would facilitate the information processing to some extent
at the IoT could and put little bit less burden on semantic overlay layer (see Fig. 4).
One of the most popular examples of light weight semantics are Microformats [16] that
use existing XHTML techniques. RDFa [17] is another notable light weight semantics tech-
nology that allow semantic markup to be included within XHTML. RDFa is more powerful
than Microformats as it can include powerful expressive ontologies. Ostermaier et al. [18]
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proposed a sensor microformats using HTML syntax. Otherwise there is no standard and
acceptable format of light weight semantics for sensors.
Scalability of semantic enhancement is real concern considering the sheer size of IoT
environment. Here we are talking about not only thousands of sensors but also lot of data
from them. The complexity and size of the ontologies affect the execution of rules. When rule
needs to evaluate scores of relationships in a big ontology, it may take considerable amount
of time to compute any decision. One of our earlier papers [19] analysed this aspect and
concluded that deriving decisions using real-time semantic reasoning may take considerable
time due to bigger ontology and complex rules.
7.2 Challenges
While ETSI defines through the TS 102 690 the interoperability between operators, and
specifically the key exchange to authorize sensors or sensor gateways, the standard lacks
the semantic overlay. As pointed out in the implementation section, and defined in Fig. 4,
the semantic overlay can act as a mediator between sensor, service, and access layers. The
overlay may contain the following entities:
SensorML [7] is aiming at providing a semantic description of the sensor, allowing for
specification of the output format and other sensor characteristics.
Sensor Models to describe the “normal” behavior of a sensor, allowing for classifications
of non-standard deviations.
Sensor Deployment represent the information on where and how sensors are deployed.
Such deployment information will allow for monitoring of the environment, and calcula-
tions of dependencies.
Service Access ontologies to describe the content-aware distribution of sensor data, in
conjunction with the Service Notifier.
Interoperability Information for federation of sensor data, foreseen for privacy or trust-
based distribution.
While the semantic representation opens for interoperability, the challenge of reasoning
on low-power sensors and devices is not solved. Our suggestion is to work into the direction
of light-weight semantics, including both (i) light weight descriptions, (ii) local reasoning
and (iii) extractions of rules to be executed on sensors or gateways.
The last area of future research addresses the scalability of semantic enhancements. Medi-
ation of ontologies and distributed reasoning, including trust-based access to confidential
sensor, context and personal information, is required for privacy protection of the future IoT.
8 Conclusion
The Internet of Things-enabled services may require integration of multiple administrative
domains. One domain may host the devices and enable access to devices and information,
whereas another domain may make use of the information for designing innovative services.
Each domain contains its own security attributes and constraints. To facilitate secure access
to services, devices and data in such integrated operation scenario, ensuring interoperability
of security is a challenging task. In order to address this challenge, this paper proposed an
architecture and presented implementation details of parts of the architecture involving real
devices and platform. As it is a challenging task to provide a complete solution, the paper
also identified several challenges and possible future works.
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